Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees

We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Hardy, Daniel C. L.
Other Persons:	Nieto, María J. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Einlagensicherung \| Deposit insurance \| Bankenaufsicht \| Banking supervision \| EU-Staaten \| EU countries \| Internationale Zusammenarbeit \| International cooperation

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Series:	Banco de Espana Working Paper ; No. 1126
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 11, 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1942158 [DOI]
Classification:	F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration ; F59 - International Relations and International Political Economy: Other ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119693