Previous work in the economic theory of parking has treated parkers as homogeneous. In almost all policy contexts, however, heterogeneity among individuals matters not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. For example, providing both tolled and untolled alternatives allows those with high values of time to pay largely with money and those with low values of time to pay only with time. This paper extends the authors’ (2009) integrated model of parking and traffic congestion in an isotropic downtown in steady state to treat heterogeneity in the value of time and parking duration. It develops the theory, and then presents an extended numerical example that applies the theory to several policy scenarios. With homogeneous individuals, underpricing curbside parking leads to wasteful cruising for parking. With heterogeneous individuals, however, curbside time limits can be used to ration out those with longer parking durations, so that cruising for parking is eliminated. With curbside parking time limits, underpricing curbside parking downtown may be a sound policy response to the free parking provided by suburban shopping centers.
