Customs Unions and the Core

AbstractCustoms union formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries make coalitional choices according to core theory. In the second stage optimal tariffs are determined. This yields a theory that predicts which customs unions form. An example shows that a customs union can be an equilibrium even when both member countries do better at free trade.

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Authors:	RIEZMAN, Raymond
Published in:	International Trade Agreements and Political Economy.
Subject:	International Trade \| Political Economy \| Theory of International Free Trade Agreements \| Customs Unions \| Tariff Dynamics \| Storable Votes

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	P16 - Political Economy ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206504