Decentralization and Collusion.

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude.

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Baliga, S. ; Sjostrom, T.
Institutions:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), Department of Economics
Subject:	INFORMATION \| GAME THEORY

Series:	Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	31 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245587