Decentralization of the core through Nash equilibrium

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this excrcise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretation of asymptotic core convergence, namely the emergence of price taking.

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Year of publication:	2008-05-01
Authors:	KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas ; ZIROS, Nicholas
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	core \| Nash equilibrium \| asymptotic proximity \| decentralization

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2008026
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008518