Decomposition and Representation of Coalitional Games

A coalitional game is a real-valued set function v defined on an algebra F of subsets of a space X such that v(0)=0. We prove the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between coalitional games bounded with respect to the composition norm and countably additive measures defined on an appropriate space.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Marinacci, Massimo
Publisher:	Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 1152
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/221508 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1152 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235964