Defining 'Accidents' in the Air : Why Tort Law Principles are Essential in Interpreting the Montreal Convention's 'Accident' Requirement

Exceptions do not exist in a vacuum; in fact, exceptions to a principle are usually formed using those principles to which it is an exception. Even so, United States courts interpreting the “accident” requirement of the Montreal Convention — an exception to traditional tort law regarding injuries sustained during international air travel — fail to use tort law in evaluating whether certain situations meet the “accident” criteria. Consequentially, many decisions render airlines responsible for a passenger's injuries where any other premises owner would not be implicated in the same circumstances. This directly contrasts the intent of the Montreal Convention's creators, who wanted to limit carrier liability to foster the airline industry's viability. Instead of interpreting “accident” to make carriers liable in a narrower set of circumstances and thereby protect airlines, courts are interpreting “accident” in a way that broadens the airline's responsibilities.This Note examines the history of and the reasons for the Montreal Convention, which in part forces airlines to indemnify passengers for injuries resulting from incidents qualifying as “accidents” — a term undefined in the treaty. The Convention and the subsequent case law interpreting it show to qualify as an “accident,” the injury-producing incident must be causally connected to the plane's operation. Importantly, the causal connection's adequacy should be evaluated according to American tort jurisprudence even though the “accident” requirement itself is an exception to general tort law. This Note focuses on a particular type of injury-producing event, a co-passenger tort, because of its interesting causal nature that exemplifies the contrast between decisions using tort law and those rendered under the Convention