Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts.

Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain delays in bargaining. This is not always appropriate, particularly when the parties are in a long-term relationship. This paper examines the incentive to delay agreement (or innovation) when: there are multiple bargaining periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Wait, A.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| INFORMATION \| DISTRIBUTION

More details

Series:	Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 809 40 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574851