Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tamada, Yasunari ; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 99.2014, p. 178-194
|
Subject: | Career concerns | Delegation | Sequential investment | Sunk cost fallacy | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Entscheidung | Decision | Sunk Costs | Sunk costs | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment |
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