Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Peters, Wolfgang ; Wärneryd, Karl
Published in:	Managerial and Decision Economics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., ISSN 0143-6570. - Vol. 25.2004, 5, p. 283-290
Publisher:	John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200308