Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures

We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. If the game is constant-sum and homogeneous, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players who move first forms and payoffs are proportional to the voting weights.

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Year of publication:	2006-11
Authors:	Montero, Maria ; Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2006-11
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672343