Deserving Poor and the Desirability of Minimum Wage Rules

In this paper we provide a novel justification for the use of minimum wage rules to supplement the optimal tax-and-transfer system. We demonstrate that if labor supply decisions are concentrated along the intensive margin and employment is efficiently rationed, a minimum wage rule can be socially beneficial by serving as a tagging device that targets benefits to the deserving poor, defined as low-skilled workers exhibiting a weak taste for leisure

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Blumḳin, Tomer
Other Persons:	Danziger, Leif (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Theorie \| Theory \| Armut \| Poverty

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4721
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 16, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2425588 [DOI]
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H50 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055362