Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Toulis, Panos ; Parkes, David C. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 91.2015, p. 360-382
|
Subject: | Kidney exchange | Random graphs | Mechanism design | Maximum matching | Integer programming | Incentive compatible design | Graphentheorie | Graph theory | Organtransplantation | Organ transplantation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Matching | Ganzzahlige Optimierung | Anreiz | Incentives | Tauschwirtschaft | Barter economy |
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