Design of Incentives in Community based Health Insurance Schemes

... This paper discusses solutions to important incentive problems in micro-health insurance schemes which threaten their sustainability. In particular, three issues explored are : (i) if defining household as unit of insurance always mitigates adverse selection problem; (ii) how ex ante moral hazard problem can be circumvented through groupinsurance contract; and (iii) how to set incentives for scheme managers.

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Year of publication:	2003-02-01
Authors:	Ahuja, Rajeev ; Jütting, Johannes
Publisher:	Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations
Subject:	Gesundheitswesen \| public health sector \| Indien \| India \| Reform

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1. Introduction
2. The Need for Conceptual Clarity: Differences between Informal Insurance, Market Insurance and Community Based Insurance Schemes
3. Addressing Important Incentive Problems in Community Based Insurance Schemes: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Incentives for Managers
4. The Role of Public Policy in Setting the Right Incentives
5. Conclusions

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