Destroy to save

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n>m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be burnt to support dominant-strategy implementation.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	de Clippel, Geoffroy ; Naroditskiy, Victor ; Polukarov, Maria ; Greenwald, Amy ; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 86.2014, C, p. 392-404
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Redistribution mechanisms \| Budget balance \| Inefficient allocation

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D44 - Auctions ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785205