Deterministic budget-feasible clock auctions
| Year of publication: |
2025
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Balkanski, Eric ; Garimidi, Pranav ; Gkatzelis, Vasilis ; Schoepflin, Daniel ; Tan, Xizhi |
| Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 73.2025, 6, p. 2972-2985
|
| Subject: | Market Analytics and Revenue Management | budget-feasible | procurement auction | submodular maximization | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Auktion | Auction | Beschaffung | Procurement | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract |
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