Deterrence vs. gamesmanship : taxpayer response to targeted audits and endogenous penalties
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Phillips, Mark D. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 100.2014, p. 81-98
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Subject: | Tax evasion | Deterrence | Information reporting | Targeted audits | Steuerstrafrecht | Criminal tax law | Steuervermeidung | Tax avoidance | Strafe | Punishment | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Steuermoral | Tax compliance | Außenprüfung | Tax audit | Theorie | Theory | Steuerflucht | Cross-border tax evasion |
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