Differentiation and risk aversion in imperfectly competitive labor markets
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Bannier, Christina E. ; Feess, Eberhard ; Packham, Natalie ; Walzl, Markus |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 177.2021, 1, p. 1-27
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Subject: | incentive compensation | screening | imperfect labor market competition | vertical differentiation | horizontal differentiation | risk aversion | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Unvollkommener Wettbewerb | Imperfect competition | Produktdifferenzierung | Product differentiation | Unvollkommener Markt | Incomplete market | Risiko | Risk | Wettbewerb | Competition | Arbeitsmarkt | Labour market | Anreiz | Incentives | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | Labour market theory |
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