Dilemme en action motrice et robustesse de la stratégie évolutionnairement stable
In a game of evolution solved by the motor action, the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ess) is robust? Fifty-six student athletes participate in the game Hawks versus Doves. The each play five times. Two players are at the same distance from a balloon. They secretly choose a jersey, different color for dove and hawk. At the signal, everyone tries to bring the ball into this camp. Players use the techniques of rugby for hawk and the techniques of basketball for dove. The ess invites theoretically choose hawk 7 out of 12. Of the 140 tournaments, the players (25) who have played the Nash equilibrium have not maximized their gains. This is due to the motor relevance of the game. Players away from the ess show a different logic based on their dynamic possibilities of intervention in conjunction with the characteristics of the other players. Classification JEL : C72, C88, C93<np pagenum="796"/>
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Collard, Luc ; Oboeuf, Alexandre ; Legrand, Marc |
Published in: |
Revue économique. - Presses de Sciences-Po. - Vol. 63.2012, 4, p. 795-808
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Publisher: |
Presses de Sciences-Po |
Saved in:
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