Directors' remuneration : a comparison of Italian and UK non-financial listed firms' diclosure
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Melis, Andrea ; Gaia, Silvia ; Carta, Silvia |
Published in: |
The British accounting review : the journal of the British Accounting Association. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0890-8389, ZDB-ID 1015419-X. - Vol. 47.2015, 1, p. 66-84
|
Subject: | Agency theory | Directors' remuneration | Disclosure | Legitimacy theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Führungskräfte | Managers | Italien | Italy | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Aktiengesellschaft | Listed company | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vorstand | Executive board | Legitimität | Legitimacy | Vergleich | Comparison |
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