Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution game with n players and characterize equilibria of the subscription game involving positive contributions

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Monteiro, Paulo Klinger ; Menezes, Flávio Marques ; Temimi, Akram
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 1999 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D79 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. Other ; D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other ; H89 - Miscellaneous Issues. Other
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168390