Discrete‐time dynamic principal-agent models : contraction mapping theorem and computational treatment
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Renner, Philipp ; Schmedders, Karl |
Published in: |
Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1759-7331, ZDB-ID 2569569-1. - Vol. 11.2020, 4, p. 1215-1251
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Subject: | Optimal unemployment tax | principal-agent model | repeated moralhazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitslosigkeit | Unemployment | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/QE960 [DOI] hdl:10419/253564 [Handle] |
Classification: | C63 - Computational Techniques ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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