Discussion of "CEO compensation and corporate risk-taking : evidence from a natural experiment"
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher |
| Other Persons: | Gormley, Todd A. (reviewed) ; Matsa, David A. (reviewed) ; Milbourn, Todd (contributor) |
| Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 56.2013, 2/3, S1, p. 102-111
|
| Subject: | Legal liability | Regulatory risk | Tail risk | Stock options | Compensation | Managerial incentives | Aktienoption | Stock option | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risiko | Risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Haftung | Liability | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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CEO compensation and corporate risk : evidence from a natural experiment
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CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk : Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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