Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Amal Hili Didier Laussel Ngo Van Long
| Year of publication: |
December 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Hili, Amal ; Laussel, Didier ; Long, Ngo Van |
| Published in: |
Pacific economic review. - Richmond, Victoria : Wiley Publishing Asia, ISSN 1361-374X, ZDB-ID 1386453-1. - Vol. 22.2017, 5, p. 743-771
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| Subject: | stock grants | executive compensation | incentive contracts | moral hazard | agency problems | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktienoption | Stock option | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1111/1468-0106.12243 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011813571