Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bumin Yenmez, M.
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 48.2012, 2, p. 77-82
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Efficient mechanisms \| Multidimensional types \| Multi-object auctions

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875276