Do better managers get better loan contracts?
Bill B. Francis, Ning Ren, Xian Sun, and Qiang Wu
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Francis, Bill B. ; Ren, Ning ; Sun, Xian ; Wu, Qiang |
| Published in: |
Abacus : a journal of accounting, finance and business studies. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1467-6281, ZDB-ID 1480492-X. - Vol. 60.2024, 3, p. 539-577
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| Subject: | Agency costs of debt | Bank loan contracting | Default risk | Information opacity | Managerial ability | Kreditrisiko | Credit risk | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Kapitalkosten | Cost of capital | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Kredit | Credit | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Vertrag | Contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1111/abac.12313 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015121160