Do co-opted boards enhance or reduce R&D productivity?
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Harris, Oneil ; Glegg, Charmaine ; Buckley, Winston |
Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 50.2019, p. 1-12
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Subject: | Agency theory | Board co-option | R&D productivity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Produktivität | Productivity | Theorie | Theory | Vorstand | Executive board | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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