Do compensation consultants enable higher CEO pay? : a disclosure rule change as a separating device
Jenny Chu, Jonathan Faasse, P. Raghavendra Rau
| Year of publication: |
October 2018
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| Authors: | Chu, Jenny ; Faasse, Jonathan ; Rau, P. Raghavendra |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 10, p. 4915-4935
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| Subject: | executive compensation | disclosure | governance | regulatory changes | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmensberatung | Consultancy services | Großbritannien | United Kingdom |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2845 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932641