Do corporate managers skimp on shareholders' dividends to protect their own retirement funds?
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Eisdorfer, Assaf ; Giaccotto, Carmelo ; White, Reilly |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 30.2015, p. 257-277
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Dividend policy | Agency theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Dividende | Dividend | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Managervergütung | Ausschüttungspolitik | Payout policy | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Theorie | Theory |
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