Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? : indications from a quasi-natural experiment
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Abudy, Menachem Meni ; Amiram, Dan ; Rozenbaum, Oded ; Shust, Efrat |
Published in: |
Journal of banking & finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4266, ZDB-ID 752905-3. - Vol. 114.2020, p. 1-16
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Governance | Optimal contracts | Managervergütung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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