Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Core, John E. ; Guay, Wayne R. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 113.2014, 3, p. 383-403
|
Subject: | Corporate governance | Board of directors | Corporate transparency | Information asymmetry | Board regulations | Corporate Governance | Board of Directors | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vorstand | Executive board | Führungskräfte | Managers | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Transparenz | Transparency |
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