Do investors optimize, follow heuristics, or listen toexperts?

In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n _> 2)state-specic assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume andEasley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds accordingto the constant probabilities of the various states. The dierent treatmentsendow none, one, three, or all subjects in groups of eight investors each withprobability information. Will investments follow the theoretical benchmarkor the 1=n-heuristic of equal investments in all assets? Further, will agentswith probability information be asked and paid for advice on how to invest?Although investment does not converge as predicted, portfolios of informedagents reect the probabilities of states, and even uninformed agents do notinvest according to the 1=n-heuristic. Advice is demanded and readily paidfor. Surprisingly, clients do not always follow the recommendation. Competitionamong advisors reduces their fees as expected.