Do local union strategies explain the (unexpected) union pay premium in China?

Purpose: The authors investigate the extent to which differences in provincial union legislation have impacts on the union earnings premium. Design/methodology/approach: Content analysis of provincial union regulations of 25 provinces is conducted to create two indices: one reflecting the degree of stringency of the local requirement that unions be established in a timely fashion and the other reflecting requirements for employers to negotiate wages with the union. The authors use individual level data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) of 2010 to estimate the union earnings premium. Findings: The authors find that unionised workers in China receive an earnings premium ranging from 6.4 to 9.6%, which is in range of other studies (but not all) for China that tend to find a (perhaps surprising) union wage premium in spite of the fact that unions tend to be “company unions” designed to foster stability and growth and to serve as a transmission belt for the wishes of the Party rather than bargaining for the benefit of their members. The authors also find that provincial requirements to establish unions in a timely fashion enhance the impact of unions on the earnings of their members, but provincial requirements to negotiate wages dampen the effect of unions on the earnings of their members. Reasons for these results are discussed. Originality/value: Despite this lack of independence of the Chinese unions, research continuously finds that Chinese unions have effects that are surprisingly similar to those of unions in Western countries. This paper drills deeper into the underlying mechanisms to see if local union strategies, exemplified by provincial union legislation, can explain the unexpected union effects on compensation. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to do so. Moreover, the authors use individual-level data in contrast to most studies on China that use firm or provincial level aggregate data.