Do the incentive effects of relative performance measurement vary with the ex ante probability of promotion?
B. William Demeré, Ranjani Krishnan, Karen L. Sedatole, Alexander Woods
| Year of publication: |
2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Demeré, B. William ; Krishnan, Ranjani ; Sedatole, Karen L. ; Woods, Alexander |
| Published in: |
Management accounting research. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1044-5005, ZDB-ID 1040541-0. - Vol. 30.2016, p. 18-31
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| Subject: | Relative performance measurement (RPM) | Relative performance evaluation (RPE) | Tournaments | Promotions | Incentive contracting | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Anreiz | Incentives |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.mar.2015.09.002 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448372