Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?

Vera Angelova, Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Angelova, Vera ; Giebe, Thomas ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Publisher:	Munich, Germany : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190
Subject:	contest \| tournament \| real-effort \| experiment \| contract theory \| forward-looking \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Experiment \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Arbeitsleistung \| Job performance \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 15 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion paper. - München : Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, ZDB-ID 2881680-8. - Vol. no. 60 (December 28, 2017)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/185730 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; M5 - Personnel Economics
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040