Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory

In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

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Year of publication:	2013-03-18
Authors:	Weiss, Arne Robert ; Wolff, Irenaeus
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 33.2013, 1, p. 794-796
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Elections \| Electoral campaigns \| Dictator game \| Social distance \| Experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; C9 - Design of Experiments
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631233