Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? Evidence from the Laboratory

In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

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Year of publication:	2013-10-31
Authors:	Weiss, Arne Robert ; Wolff, Irenaeus
Institutions:	Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz
Subject:	Elections \| Electoral Campaigns \| Dictator Game \| Social Distance \| Entitlement \| Experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2013-19 5 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011070844