Does better CSR disclosure minimise the problem of asymmetric financial reporting? : the role of market supervision
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Ho, Kung-Cheng ; Xu, Xin ; Shen, Xixi ; Yu, Jinxin |
Published in: |
Spanish journal of finance & accounting : the official journal of AECA - Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 2332-0753, ZDB-ID 2567008-6. - Vol. 53.2024, 1, p. 99-122
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Subject: | adverse selection | CSR | financial reporting asymmetry | financial reporting comparability | market supervision | moral hazard | Corporate Social Responsibility | Corporate social responsibility | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Rechnungswesen | Accounting | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Jahresabschluss | Financial statement | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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