Does common institutional ownership mitigate hold-up problems along the supply chain?
Year of publication: |
2025
|
---|---|
Authors: | Deng, Yongning ; Li, Jing ; Peng, Qilin ; Yao, Wentao |
Published in: |
Financial management : FM. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1755-053X, ZDB-ID 2254144-5. - Vol. 54.2025, 1, p. 3-31
|
Subject: | common ownership | innovation | investment specificity | supply chain hold-up problems | Lieferkette | Supply chain | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Theorie | Theory | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Investition | Investment |
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