Does Competition Among Public Officials Reduce Corruption? An Experiment
Year of publication: |
2013-02
|
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Authors: | Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Serra, Danila |
Institutions: | Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Competition | Extortionary Corruption | Experiment |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 1301 |
Classification: | D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; D49 - Market Structure and Pricing. Other ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior |
Source: |
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Is More Competition Always Better? An Experimental Study of Extortionary Corruption
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