Does corporate governance compliance increase company value? : evidence from the best practice of the board

Drawing upon agency theory, we address the limitations of best practice code in the context of emerging governance, emphasizing the role of concentrated ownership. While the code provisions were formulated in developed countries, the transfer of one-size-fits-all guidelines may not address the characteristics and challenges of emerging and post-transition economies. Specifically, we emphasize that provisions of corporate governance codes are aimed at solving the principal-agent conflict between shareholders and managers. These guidelines may remain limited in addressing principal-principal conflicts between majority and minority shareholders and have either a lesser effect on valuation or none at all. Using a unique sample of 155 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange during the period 2006-2015, with hand-collected data from declarations of conformity, we tested the hypotheses on the link between corporate governance compliance (with board) practice and company value. The period of 2006-2015 was chosen deliberately, due to the relative stability of corporate governance code recommendations over this time. The results of our panel model reveal a negative and statistically significant relation between corporate governance compliance and company value. We contribute to the existing literature providing new evidence on compliance practice in the context of concentrated ownership, and the limited effect of code provisions in addressing structural challenges of corporate governance in emerging post-transition economies and hierarchy-based control systems.