Does firm payout policy affect shareholders' dissatisfaction with directors?
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tanyi, Paul ; Smith, David B. ; Cheng, Xiaoyan |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1573-7179, ZDB-ID 2009625-2. - Vol. 57.2021, 1, p. 279-320
|
Subject: | Director elections corporate governance | Dividend payouts | Shareholders’ dissatisfaction | Board monitoring | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Dividende | Dividend | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Vorstand | Executive board | Führungskräfte | Managers | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Ausschüttungspolitik | Payout policy | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value |
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