Does government precommitment promote environmental innovation?

This paper investigates the effect of credibility of environmental policies on environmental innovation and welfare. When the government precommits to an emission tax, the monopolist's abatement effort is lower than if the environmental policy is at the government's discretion. Time consistent emission tax is lower than optimal emission tax under precommitment. Finally, welfare is always higher if the government can commit to an emission tax.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Petrakis, Emmanuel ; Xepapadeas, Anastasios P.
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Glaubwürdigkeit \| Umweltpolitik \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Umweltschutzinvestition \| Investitionsentscheidung \| Monopol \| Theorie \| Monopoly \| Non-credible policies \| Precommitment \| Emission Tax \| Abatement effort

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 88.1998
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/154946 [Handle]
Classification:	L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Q25 - Water ; Q28 - Government Policy
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608456