Does improved information improve incentives?
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, Daniel Gottlieb
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 130.2018, 2, p. 291-307
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| Subject: | Executive compensation | Limited liability | Options | Relative performance evaluation | Risk management | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikomanagement | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Beschränkte Haftung | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012051316