Does incentive conflict between CEOs and CFOs benefit firms? : implications for corporate decision-making
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Han, Feng ; Qin, Qi ; Peabody, S. Drew |
Published in: |
Research in international business and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0275-5319, ZDB-ID 424514-3. - Vol. 63.2022, p. 1-20
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Financial policy | Financial risk | Incentive conflict | Managerial incentives | Risk-taking | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude |
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