Does managerial myopia affect firms’ green merger and acquisition? : evidence from Chinese firms in high-polluting industries

Utilizing a dataset comprising 1536 merger and acquisition transactions involving Chinese A-share listed firms operating in high-polluting industries during the period of 2001-2020, this paper aims to investigate managerial myopic impact on green merger and acquisition. The primary findings indicate that managerial myopia significantly impedes the occurrence of green merger and acquisition activities within firms operating in high-polluting industries. This adverse effect is consistently observed across various models. Mechanism tests reveal that myopic managers exert an adverse influence on firms' green merger and acquisition by reducing the level of analyst attention and the environmental, social, and governance ratings among these companies. Furthermore, the results of the moderating tests demonstrate that stronger internal supervision, a higher firm value, and a male chief executive officer can substantially alleviate managerial myopic negative impact on green merger and acquisition. Additionally, heterogeneity checks propose that managerial myopic detrimental impact on firms' green merger and acquisition is particularly pronounced in companies characterized by weak governance structures, lower tax burdens, and those operating in the decline stage. The insights from this research carry significant policy implications for industries with high levels of pollution, particularly in emerging economies.