Does 'Non-Committed' Government Always Generate Lower Social Welfare then its 'Committed' Counter-Part
Year of publication: |
2003-06
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Authors: | Zigic, Kresimir |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | first versus second best strategic policy | government commitment | optimal tariffs and subsidies | technological spillovers |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 3946 |
Classification: | F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives |
Source: |
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Strategic Trade Policy, the "Committed" versus "Non-Committed" Government, and R&D Spillovers
Zigic, Kresimir, (2001)
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Strategic Trade Policy, the "Committed" versus "Non-Committed" Government, and R&D Spillovers
Zigic, Kresimir, (2001)
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Žigić, Krešimir, (2011)
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Tariff Protection, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade with Perfect Price Flexibility
Ionascu, Delia, (2004)
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Kúnin, Michael, (2004)
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Ionascu, Delia, (2001)
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