Does powerful executive holding a dual post as the board secretary reduce nonpunitive regulation?
Huiqin Huang, Chenglong Wang, Wei Yu, Keying Zhu
| Year of publication: |
2023
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Huang, Huiqin ; Wang, Chenglong ; Yu, Wei ; Zhu, Keying |
| Published in: |
International review of financial analysis. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1057-5219, ZDB-ID 1133622-5. - Vol. 89.2023, p. 1-14
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| Subject: | Agency cost | Comment letter | Dual post | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vorstand | Executive board | Regulierung | Regulation | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102797 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467248