Does say-on-pay benefit shareholders?
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Vithayathil, Joseph ; Shivendu, Shivendu |
Published in: |
International journal of corporate governance : IJCG. - Genève : Inderscience Enterprises, ISSN 1754-3045, ZDB-ID 2436106-9. - Vol. 11.2020, 3/4, p. 223-264
|
Subject: | say-on-pay | CEO compensation | managerial compensation | moral hazard | adverse selection | incentive compensation | board of directors | boards | corporate governance | collusion | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vorstand | Executive board | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Board of Directors | Board of directors |
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