Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?
Sayantan Ghosal; Kannika Thampanishvong
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Ghosal, Sayantan ; Kannika Thampanishvong |
| Published in: |
Journal of international economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996, ZDB-ID 120143-8. - Vol. 89.2013, 1, p. 68-78
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| Subject: | Sovereign debt | Coordination | Moral hazard | Collective Action Clauses | Ex ante | Ex post | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Schuldenmanagement | Debt management | Internationale Staatsschulden | International sovereign debt | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Kollektives Handeln | Collective action |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691614